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Preface
The following document has been formatted as an electronic thesis. Hyperlinks
are intended to facilitate navigation from the table of contents, list of figures and tables to
main text within the main document as well as the supplementary appendix sections.
The publications presented in this document are the research conducted as part of
my Masters degree in Environmental and Energy Policy at Michigan Technological
University.
Chapter 1 presents a historical institutionalism policy analysis on China’s biofuel
policy using a Historical Institutionalism Ends and Means (HIEM) framework. The data
was collected and analyzed by me. Dr. Adam Wellstead introduced the HIEM framework
to me. Dr. Audrey Mayer and Dr. Adam Wellstead provided comments on writing the
paper.
Chapter 2 presents a political ecology analysis on the Chinese public media’s
discourse on China’s land acquisition for biofuel production in Africa. The data was
collected and analyzed by me. Dr. Emma Norman provided help on the political ecology
analysis part of the paper. Dr. Kari Henquinet, Dr. Audrey Mayer, Dr. Emma Norman
and Dr. Robert Handler provided comments on writing the paper.

Ͷ

Abstract
China has recently undertaken a very ambitious biofuel production program.
However due to a lack of arable land domestically, this program has necessitated the
leasing of arable land elsewhere (e.g., in Africa). This thesis first conducts a policy
analysis of China’s biofuel policy using a historical institutionalism ends-and-means
framework. The analysis reveals the ways in which China achieves its biofuel production
goals through adopting various levels of policy means. China’s success in biofuel
development is partly due to its unique policy-making and policy-assessment system,
which ensures that biofuel production goals can be met. The second chapter analyzes
China’s discourse on Chinese companies’ land acquisitions for biofuel production in
Africa. Revealed through China’s press coverage since 2007 on this issue, it is clear that
China’s public media promoted the perception that China’s land acquisition in Africa is a
win-win situation for both China and Africa, helping China’s economic development as
well as contributing to Africa’s sustainability. Even though some efforts towards
realizing social sustainability have been reported, the attitude of the Chinese public media
(also the Chinese government) toward land tenure rights, human rights, and stakeholder
involvement is still hazy; these are the concerns that are most prevalent in the scholarly
literature.

ͷ

Introduction
The replacement of petroleum-based transportation fuels with renewable biofuels is
an emerging imperative in many countries, commonly to achieve energy independence
(self-sufficiency) goals, reduce carbon dioxide emissions, and encourage domestic
industry development (Buyx & Tait, 2011; Gomiero, Paoletti, & Pimentel, 2010; Greene,
2011). Even though biofuel production is a new industry with only less than 20 years of
history in China compared to Brazil, the United States (US) and European Union (EU),
the development of the biofuel industry in China is notable with respect to the speed at
which it has developed (Figure 1). In less than 20 years, China has become the world’s
third largest country in biofuel production after Brazil and the US, and has routinely
surpassed its five-year production goals. According to “The Twelfth Five Years Strategic
Plan for Renewable Energy Development” (2012), China is aiming to make renewable
energy satisfy 11.4% of total energy consumption in 2015. In order to reach this goal,
China will produce 4 million tons of bioethanol and 1 million tons of biodiesel by 2015
(NEA, 2012). The Chinese government is also looking to expand the production of
biofuels even further in the future so that renewable energy will account for 15% of total
energy consumption by 2020, which means that China will produce 10 million tons of
bioethanol and 2 million tons of biodiesel by 2020 (NEA, 2012).
However, China’s large population and limited availability of arable land make it
challenging to meet this target domestically. In addition, the biofuel policy in China does
not specify that biofuel feedstock and production have to come from the domestic market.
Given all these facts, it should not be surprising that China has joined the trend in



overseas land acquisition; China has committed itself to several land acquisition 1 deals
that will allow it to grow biofuel crops in other countries (Von Braun & Meinzen-Dick,
2009). In its September 2010 report, the World Bank claims that there are now about 45
million ha covered by recent large-scale land acquisitions, 70% of which are in Africa
(Deininger & Byerlee, 2011).
My research will address the following research questions:
1. How have China’s domestic biofuel policies along with food security concerns
driven China’s land acquisition for biofuel biomass in Africa?
2. What does a HIEM analysis of China’s biofuel policy reveal about China’s unique
biofuel production trajectory?
3. What is the Chinese public media’s discourse on its land acquisition for biofuel
production in Africa?
4. What is the relationship between Chinese public media’s discourse and China’s
policy on land acquisition for biofuel production in Africa?
My thesis is composed of two chapters: Chapter 1, A Historical Institutionalism
Analysis of China’s Biofuel Policy; and Chapter 2, A Political Ecology Analysis of
China’s Discourse on China’s Land Acquisition for Biofuels in Africa. In the first
chapter, I used a historical institutionalism framework to review and analyze the policy
ends and means of China’s biofuel policy. Historical institutionalism is an approach to
study policy change which features historical orientation as a way to understand how
institutions structure and change political behavior and outcomes (Steinmo 2008). Its


ͳOther

common words referring to overseas land acquisition include “land grabbing” and “land
investment”, where the former places an emphasis on the negative aspects of the trend and the latter from a
positive perspective. In order to maintain the neutrality of this study, I am using “land acquisition” here.



function of explaining the interaction effects among different historical processes as they
unfold over time, thus recovering the causality of historical events, has been recognized
as a powerful approach to study politics and the policy process (Thelen 2002). Cashore
and Howlett (2007) argued that every policy is in fact a complex regime of ends- and
means-related goals, objectives and settings, and policy change can occur at the following
six levels: abstract goals, objectives, specifications, instrument logic, mechanism and
calibration (Cashore and Howlett 2007). Therefore, I would like to review the whole
history of China’s biofuel policy by analyzing its policy ends and means, thus exploring
how China achieved its rapid development of biofuel production, and illustrate the ways
in which China’s commitment to develop biofuel production serves as a driving force for
land acquisition in Africa.
Chapter 2 of my thesis is a political ecology discourse analysis of China’s land
acquisition for biofuel feedstock production in Africa. In this chapter, I conducted a
discourse analysis on data collected from the Chinese public media. I used the lens of
sustainability to analyze the nature of China’s land acquisition for biofuel production in
Africa. In addition, I conducted a brief review of China’s policies applied to land
acquisition in Africa and an analysis on the policy implication of the discourse.

ͺ

Chapter 1 A Historical Institutionalism Analysis of China’s Biofuel
Policy
1.1 Introduction

As a promising alternative to fossil fuel-based transportation energy, biomass-based
biofuels have become a common imperative in many countries such as US, Brazil, Canada,
Australia, India, France, Germany and China, in order to achieve energy security, mitigate
climate change and develop rural economies (Sorda, Banse, & Kemfert, 2010).
Governments across the world have adopted various policy instruments that foster the
biofuel industry (Sorda et al., 2010). For example, since 1978 the US has subsidized its
ethanol industry using tax credits, mandatory blending requirements, blending credits, and
import tariffs (Sorda et al., 2010). In addition, the 2007 Energy Independence and Security
Act (EISA) requires that 36 million gallons of biofuels be used in the U.S. for road
transportation by 2022 (Josling, Blandford, & Earley, 2010). Creating a consumption
requirement is another way to subsidize production. As for Brazil, instead of subsidies, its
government has focused on mandatory blending requirements, investments to support
biofuel research and technology development, and creating a market for modified vehicles
running on biofuels (Sorda et al., 2010). A well-structured policy analysis can determine
the success or failure of these policy approaches, and provide other countries with lessons
toward more efficient and sustainable biofuels development.
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Figure 1.1 China Bioethanol Production (Millions of gallons) (Data source: usda.gov)

Many scholars have provided useful descriptions of Chinese biofuels policies. Qiu et
al’s (2012) comprehensive overview of major legislation and policies found that China’s
concern for food security impacted China’s biofuels development policy, by moving from
cereal-based to non-cereal-based biofuels production and focusing on using marginal land
for biofuels feedstock production (Qiu, Sun, Huang, & Rozelle, 2012). In addition, Qui et
al. (2012) found that China’s biofuels development targets were set with cautiousness, but
in order to meet these targets, there were still sustainability challenges (Qiu et al., 2012).
Zhang et al. (2012) found that policies promoting biodiesel using waste cooking oil were
not working effectively, because of the poor publicity of biofuels and a faulty supply chain
coordination mechanism, absence of a recycling service network, and overuse of regulatory
controls and goal planning. Wang (2011) identified the major policy obstacles that China
faces in the transition to more efficient biofuels governance, including: vague development
directions; ignored impacts on society, environment and economy; and limited public
participation. Wang and Tian (2011) summarized China’s biofuels policies, and argued
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that China may use other countries’ experience as a reference, but ultimately needs to make
policy decisions according to China’s own strategic plan and local conditions. However,
little attention has been paid to the entire policy-making history of China’s biofuels
policies. A systemic examination of this policy history will reveal the ways in which
China’s policy instruments have or have not been successfully meeting domestic biofuels
policy goals.
Here I conducted a review of China’s biofuels policies, using a framework developed
by Cashore and Howlett (2007) that considers three key policy elements: goals,
instruments, and settings. Inspired by Hall (1993), historical institutional approaches have
typically been developed for Anglo-European countries. It has never, to my knowledge,
been applied to a country with a highly concentrated political and economic system such
as China. Therefore, this policy analysis will not only provide researchers with the
application of the historical institutionalism in a new type of political system, but also a
new perspective to study China’s biofuels policies and industrial development.
Section 2 of this chapter explains the theoretical framework – historical
institutionalism, which is adopted for this analysis. In section 3, I conduct a detailed
historical institutionalism analysis of China’s biofuels policy. In section 4, I discuss about
my findings through the policy analysis. In section 5, I offer conclusions about the policy
analysis.

1.2 Theoretical Framework

Historical institutionalism is an approach to study policy change, which features a
historical orientation as a way to understand how institutions structure and change political
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behavior and outcomes (Steinmo 2008). It illuminates the interaction effects among
different historical processes as they unfold over time, thus recovering the causality of
historical events, and has been recognized as a powerful approach to study politics and the
policy process (Thelen 2002). Over the years of study on policy dynamics, scholars have
come to a widespread understanding that any analysis of policy development must be
historical in nature and cover a period of years or even decades (Cashore & Howlett, 2007).
In his study of economic policy development in Great Britain and France, Hall (1993)
proposed a new approach to analyze policy development, by distinguishing between the
means and ends of policy as well as between abstract and specific aspects of policy
measures (Hall, 1993). Cashore and Howlett (2007)’s analysis of policy change in the
Pacific Northwest forest sector went one step further and argued that every policy is in fact
a complex regime of ends- and means-related goals, objectives and settings, and that policy
change can occur at the following six levels: abstract goals, objectives, specifications,
instrument logic, mechanism and calibrations (Cashore & Howlett, 2007) (Table 1). The
historical institutionalism ends-and-means (HIEM) framework is useful for analyzing
China’s biofuels policy change, by exploring China’s policy ends and means in the six
levels mentioned by Cashore and Howlett (2007). This analysis will help us to understand
the ways in which China has been establishing three levels of policy ends: abstract goals,
objectives, and specifications, in various stages of its biofuels policy development, and
addressing these ends using policy means in three levels: instruments logic, mechanism
and calibrations.
Table 1.1 The HIEM Framework
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High Level
Program Level
Specific “on the
Goals
Operationalization ground measures”
Policy ends
GOALS
OBJECTIVES
SPECIFICATIONS
What general
What do policies
What are the
type of ideas
formally aim to
specific “on the
governing
address?
ground”
policy
requirement of the
development?
policies?
Policy means INSTRUMENT MECHANISMS
CALIBRATIONS
LOGIC
What types of
What are the
What general
instruments are
specific ways in
norms guide
utilized?
which the
policy
instrument is
implementation
applied?
preferences?
Modified from (Cashore et al., 2010)

1.3

A Historical Institutionalism Analysis


China’s biofuels development policy (Appendix 1, Table 1.) can be divided into four
policy regimes: no specific government policy (pre-2000); technological and market
testing (2001-2005); production expansion; (2006-2010) and increasingly sustainable
production (2011- present). The HIEM framework (Table 1) will be adopted to investigate
the policy ends and means in each stage except for the pre-2000 stage (when there was no
policy).
1.3.1. Pre-2000: No Specific Government Policy

In 1996, ‘China’s Ninth Five-Year Economic and Society Development Plan and
Vision Goal of 2010’ mentioned developing bioenergy as an energy source for rural areas
for the first time. However, before 2000 China did not have a specific biofuels development
policy. Instead, China’s main goal was to research processing technologies for bioethanol,
biodiesels, and fermented methane gas (Chew, 2006; Qiu et al., 2012), to establish a
ͳ͵

technical base for biofuels development. A number of laboratory tests supported by the
government were carried out under the “National High Tech Research and Development
Initiative” (Qiu et al., 2012). Research centers were established and operation data were
collected by Chinese government agencies working with Volkswagen (Chew, 2006). The
research in this period resulted in improved technology for producing corn-based
bioethanol (Qiu et al., 2012).
When the necessary technology was ready, China entered into its second stage of
biofuels development – technological and market testing.
1.3.2. 2001 – 2005 Technological and Market Testing

Table 1.2 Policy Elements 2001 – 2005
High level
Program level
Policy ends

Policy means

GOALS
Developing
bioethanol to
replace
petroleum oil

OBJECTIVES
Testing
technological and
market feasibility
of maize-based
bioethanol
INSTRUMENT MECHANISMS
LOGIC
x
Establishing
Regulatory
production testing
control and
plants;
goal planning
x
Establishing
pilot utilization
programs;
x
Setting
biofuels production
standards
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Specific “on the
ground measures”
SPECIFICATIONS
Promoting
bioethanol mixed
gasoline in specific
areas
CALIBRATIONS
x
E10
standard;
distributing
bioethanol mixed
gasoline in 27
cities of 9
provinces;
x
Financial
support to
bioethanol
production and
distribution

Goal and Instrument Logic: The goal for this stage’s biofuels policy can be found in
“China’s Tenth Five-Year Economic and Society Development Plan” (the Tenth Plan)
released in 2001. This strategic plan explicitly stated the goal of developing bioethanol as
one alternative to petroleum oil. The announcement of this new goal in China’s renewable
energy development history was based on rising global crude oil prices, increasing from
20 USD/barrel to above 100 USD/barrel in less than a decade, and a growing domestic oil
imports needed to meet growing demand due to its rapid economic growth, from 280.6
kb/d in 1995 to 1357.2 kb/d in 2000, a 29.3% increase (IEA, 2012). Facing the combination
of increasing crude oil prices and demand, the Chinese government realized the importance
of developing renewable energy resources to replace increasingly expensive petroleum oil,
and reflected that awareness in its strategic planning.
Energy (including biofuels) governance in China is dominated by the central
government. As a nation featuring highly concentrated political power and a centrally
planned economy, this should not be a surprise. The National Development and Reform
Commission (NDRC) was given the primary authority to organize the formulation of key
policies regarding renewable energy, such as issuing licenses and permits for new plant
establishment and regulating fuel prices (H. Wang, 2011). In addition to the NDRC, seven
other governmental ministries were given responsibilities to regulate the production and
distribution of bioethanol blended gasoline, including the Ministry of Finance (MOF),
Ministry of Commerce (MOC), State Administration of Taxation (SAT), Ministry of
Public Security (MPS), Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP), General
Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine (GAQSIQ), and State
Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC). In addition, due to the high cost and
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risky nature of biofuels production (H. Wang, 2011), China’s biofuels industry has been
highly dependent on governmental support from the beginning. Governmental direct
investment and subsidies are among the various forms of governmental support provided
to the industry during this stage.
Objectives and Mechanisms: To achieve the goal of developing a bioethanol industry
in China, the core objectives for this stage are represented by four executive advisory and
management measures: the Denatured Fuel Ethanol Production Standard (2001) (Standard
2001), Production Standard for Bioethanol Gasoline for Automobiles (2001) (Standard for
Bioethanol for Automobiles 2001), Pilot Testing Program for Extensive Use of BioEthanol Gasoline for Automobiles (2004) (Testing Programme 2004), and Executive
Details regarding Extensive Use of Bio-Ethanol Gasoline for Automobiles (2004)
(Executive Details 2004).
In the beginning of this policy regime, there was no supplier that could produce biofuel
in a large scale, nor a market to consume biofuel. Therefore, the Chinese government used
policies to generate both the supply and demand sides of a biofuels industry. Before
launching a nation-wide biofuels development program, the Chinese government wanted
to standardize biofuels production technology, and experiment with the market structure
for biofuel-blended fuel.
The four executive advisory and management measures also included mechanisms to
address the above-mentioned objectives. Standard 2001 included specific requirements for
bioethanol production standards. Standard for Bioethanol for Automobiles 2001 also
included detailed requirement for blending bioethanol and gasoline. The market for
bioethanol was created by two policy instruments, namely the Testing Programme 2004
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and Executive Details 2004. According to these two policies, a pilot program was
established to test whether the bioethanol-blended fuel could be used by cars.
Settings and Calibrations: To meet the objectives of testing the technological and
market feasibility of bioethanol, more policy instruments were created between 2001 and
2005.
From 2001 to 2004, the Chinese government invested $700 million USD to start four
state-owned bioethanol production companies in Henan, Jilin, Heilongjiang and Anhui
provinces. In April 2001, China announced the Standard 2001 and Standard for Bioethanol
for Automobiles 2001, and specified the production of the E10 blend (mixing 10%
bioethanol into gasoline) as a national fuel standard. For the blending, storage and
transportation of E10 products, the internal standards of China Petroleum & Chemical
Corporation (SINOPEC), a state owned corporation, were used. In March 2002, two
detailed implementation guidelines were jointly issued by the NDRC and seven other
ministries: the Pilot Testing Program of Bioethanol Gasoline for Automobiles, and the
Detailed Regulations for Implementing the Pilot Testing Program of Bioethanol Gasoline
for Automobiles. According to these two policies, a pilot program for the introduction of
E10 fuel in specified areas was launched. Then in 2004, the Testing Programme 2004 and
Executive Details 2004 were announced jointly by the same ministries, and specifically
designated 27 cities in nine provinces as markets for E10 fuel produced by the four
bioethanol plants. In addition, these policies also included specific financial incentives for
the four plants: an exemption from a five percent consumption tax on ethanol production;
a refund of value added taxes; compensated feedstock reserve prices; and compensated
losses from selling E10 versus petroleum-based fuel (Chew, 2006). A policy provision
ͳ

issued by the MOF in 2004 stated that the expected subsidies per ton of bioethanol
production would be set at RMB 2736, 2395, 2054, 1373 and 1373 yuan each year from
2004 to 2008 (Qiu et al., 2012).
1.3.3. 2006 – 2010 Expansion of Biofuels Production

Table 1.3: Policy Elements 2006 – 2010
High level
Program level
Policy ends

Specific “on the ground
measures”
SPECIFICATIONS
x Biofuels producers do
not suffer any
economic loss
x Expanding non-grain
feedstock plantations;

GOALS
OBJECTIVES
x Expanding bioethanol x Ensuring
production (reaching 2
feedstock
million tons);
supply and
consumption
x Biodiesel production
markets;
reaching 200,000 tons
by 2010;
x Ensuring food
security while
x New emphasis on
developing
Food security
biofuels
industry
Policy means INSTRUMENT
MECHANISMS
CALIBRATIONS
LOGIC
x Stop approving x Requiring petroleum
Regulatory control and
any plants using
retailers to include
goal planning
grain as
biofuels into their
feedstock;
distribution system,
or they will be
x Promoting nonpenalized;
grain feedstock
x Establishing venture
capital funds;
x Subsidies for nongrain feedstock
plantation on
marginal land;
x Low interest loans
and direct subsidies to
non-grain bioethanol
plants;
x Tax deductions
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Goals and Instrument Logic: The biofuels development goals for this stage are found
in “China’s Eleventh Five-Year Economic and Society Development Plan” (the Eleventh
Five-Year Plan) released in March 2006, as well as the Mid and Long Term Development
Plan for China’s Renewable Energy (the Mid and Long Term plan) issued in August 2007.
The Eleventh Five-Year Plan emphasized more rapid development of bioenergy and
expanding China’s production capacity of bioethanol and biodiesel. After the pilot testing
programs from 2001 to 2005, the Chinese government was more confident about China’s
biofuels production and consumption capacity, thus it was seeking to expand its biofuels
production to a larger scale. With that general goal in mind, the NDRC issued the Mid and
Long Term Plan, in which the annual biofuels production target was set as 2 million tons
of bioethanol and 0.2 million tons of biodiesel by 2010. Moreover, the Mid and Long Term
Plan also made it clear that “biofuels must not compete with grain over land, it must not
compete with the food that consumers demand, it must not compete with feed for livestock,
and it must not inflict harm on the environment.”
Regulatory control and goal planning was still the policy instrument logic behind
biofuels development in this stage. The development of biofuels production relied on goal
setting by the NDRC, laws made by the National Congress, and executive provisions issued
by state ministries such as MOF, SAT, SAF, and so on. Due to the fact that the four
bioethanol companies had been relying on government subsidies, it was difficult for them
to expand their production capacity by using a market mechanism.
Objectives and Mechanisms: At the end of last stage of biofuels policy, China had four
bioethanol production plants, as well as a regional market created by the government to
consume bioethanol. In order to expand bioethanol production, the next step was to ensure
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a stable feedstock supply. The four bioethanol plants were designed to use stale maize and
wheat from the national food stockpile, which had grown large enough to become a
financial burden to maintain. However, as the four plants’ production capacity improved,
stale corn and wheat supplies were consumed quickly. In 2006, as the stale corn stock has
been consumed completely, the bioethanol plants turned to fresh corn on the market,
causing corn prices to rise 6% in 2006 (Kearney, 2007). As a country with the largest
population of the world but only one-fourth of the world average per capita arable land (Q.
Wang & Tian, 2011), food security has always been a concern in China. Consequently, it
became obvious that if the four plants continued to use grain as feedstock, bioethanol
production would start to compete with people for food, and the limited availability of grain
would prevent bioethanol production expansion. Therefore, the Chinese government issued
several policies during this stage in order to address this conflict.
In December of 2006, the NDRC and MOF jointly issued the Notice Regarding
Strengthening the Administration to Bioethanol Projects and Promoting Healthy
Development of Bioenergy Industry, which mandated a shift to feedstock plants that were
non-edible crops such as cassava and cellulose. Furthermore, in September of 2007, the
NDRC issued the “Directive Advice Regarding Improving Sustainable Development of
Corn’s Further Processing”, in which the NDRC explicitly stated that new biofuels plants
would not be approved using grain as feedstock. In the same year, the first non-grain based
bioethanol plant, Guangxi COFCO Bioethanol Company, which uses cassava as feedstock,
was approved by the NDRC.
Specifications and Calibrations: The Chinese government used a variety of measures
to strengthen the market for the distribution and consumption of biofuel. According to
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Article 16 of the Renewable Energy Law (issued in 2005), petroleum retailers had to
include biofuels into their distribution system. If they failed to do so, they were required to
compensate biofuels producers for any losses (Article 31). In addition, in 2005, the NAT
and MOF jointly issued a Notice Concerning Taxation Policy Regulating Fuel Ethanol
Pilot Producers, providing a tax exemption to the four pilot bioethanol producers,
essentially exempting the four state owned bioethanol producers from Value-Added Tax
(VAT) and sales tax.
A number of subsidies, tax reductions, tax refunds and other financial incentives were
created to encourage the development of non-grain based bioethanol during this stage. The
Guiding Catalogue for Renewable Energy Industries issued by the NDRC in 2005 stated
that financial institutions would provide interest-free government loans for technology
research and development of non-grain and forest-based biofuels, as well as the selection
and cultivation of biofuel crops. Also the Interim Measure for Administrating Renewable
Energy Development Fund was launched by the MOF in 2006, which provided support for
non-grain based bioethanol and biodiesel. In 2008, the SAT and MOF jointly issued the
Notice about Taxation Policy for Products Generated from Comprehensive Utilization of
Resources. According to this policy, a VAT refund could be gained only if bio-diesel
producers used waste animal oil or plant oil for at least 70 percent of their raw materials.
In 2007, China issued the Biodiesel Blend Standard (BD100) for Diesel Engine Fuels.
BD100 specified a standard for producing biodiesel, but did not include a standard for
blending biodiesel with petroleum diesel. Therefore, biodiesel could not enter the
mainstream distribution network, limiting the development of the biodiesel industry. The
Biodiesel Blend Standard (B5) released in 2010 specified the standard of blending 2% ʹͳ

5% biodiesel with 95% - 98% of petroleum diesel so that the fuel can be used in vehicles,
and thus biodiesel-blended fuel started to enter the vehicle fuel distribution and
consumption network.
1.3.4. 2011 – Present: Building a More Efficient Biofuels Industry
Table 1.4 Policy Elements 2011 – Present
High level
Programme level
Specific
Policy
GOALS
OBJECTIVES
SPECIFICATIONS
ends
x Producing 4 million Expand the
x Building a sustainable
production
of
tons of bioethanol
waste cooking oil supply
and 1 million tons of biodiesel
chain
biodiesel by 2015;
x Encouraging non-grainbased bioethanol
x Producing 10 million
tons of bioethanol
production, while
and 2 million tons of
discouraging grain-based
biodiesel by 2020
bioethanol
x Paying attention to
ecological and
environmental
protection while
developing biofuels
Policy
INSTRUMENT
MECHANISMS
CALIBRATIONS
means
LOGIC
x Biodiesel
x 49 cities were picked by
Regulatory control and
mixing
the central government as
goal setting
standard;
pilot cities to establish
waste cooking oil
x Ensuring
recycling systems, and
biodiesel
financial support is
feedstock
provided by the central
supply
government
x Reduce subsidy to grainbased bioethanol from
1276 yuan/ton to 500
yuan/ton; meanwhile the
substitute to non-grainbased bioethanol is 750
yuan/ton.
Goals and Instrument Logic: By the end of the 2005 – 2010 stage, China’s biofuels
annual production had reached 1.8 million tons of bioethanol and 0.8 million tons of
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biodiesel; China became the third largest biofuels producer of the world, after Brazil and
the US. In China’s “Twelfth Five Year Strategic Plan for Renewable Energy Development”,
the NDRC stated that China would build a more efficient biofuels industry, with the goal
of producing 4 million tons of bioethanol and 1 million tons of biodiesel by 2015, and 10
million tons of bioethanol and 2 million tons of biodiesel by 2020. Given the projected
gasoline consumption of 109 and 153 million tons and diesel consumption of 205 and 281
million tons by 2015 and 2020 separately (USDA, 2013) 2, the biofuel production goal will
meet 3.7% for gasoline and 0.49% for diesel consumption by 2015, and 6.5% for gasoline
and 0.7% for diesel consumption by 2020. By “a more efficient biofuels industry”, the
NDRC means both more efficient biofuels production technology and a more stable
biofuels feedstock supply. In this document, the NDRC also stated that when developing
renewable energy, attention should be given to environmental protection, and biofuels
production should not cause depletion of forest and arable land.
Regulatory control is still the main instrument logic during this stage. The Chinese
government is not yet using market mechanisms to regulate the development of biofuel.
Objectives and Mechanisms: In 2011, the National Standard for Biodiesel Fuel was
released to give China’s biodiesel producers and distributors a technical standard to follow.
China’s biodiesel production is relatively small compared to bioethanol. By 2011,
China had approximately 50 small-scale production plants. Even though the total
production capacity of these plants can reach as high as 3 million tons, the real production
amount is only 0.8 million tons. The main reason for this, as several studies have suggested,
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is due to unreliable feedstock supplies, which has been identified as the main obstacle that
China’s biodiesel industry faces (H. Zhang, Wang, & Mortimer, 2012; Y. Zhang, Bao, Ren,
Cai, & Li, 2012). Therefore, China’s policies so far have focused on ensuring the feedstock
supply for biodiesel production.
Specifications and Calibrations:
China has been very explicit that domestic biodiesel production will use non-edible oil
as the main feedstock, thus the use of waste cooking oil has been a focus. A key bottleneck
for using waste cooking oil as feedstock is the cost effectiveness of collecting oil, therefore
China has issued several policies to build a sustainable waste cooking oil supply chain. In
2011, 33 cities were picked as pilot studies to establish a waste cooking oil recycling
system, and the central government provided 90 million USD for this effort. In 2012, 16
more cities were added to the program. NDRC is currently working on adding additional
cities for the third round.
In 2012, MOF issued a “Notice Regarding Adjusting Subsidy to Bioethnoal” and set
the subsidy to non-grain based bioethanol as 750 yuan/ton, while reduce the subsidy to
grain-based bioethanol from 1276 yuan/ton to 500 yuan/ton. The Chinese government
intends to this policy instrument to encourage second generation bioethanol production
while discouraging first generation fuels.

1.4 Conclusion

The review of China’s biofuels policy using the HIEM framework demonstrates that
China’s biofuels policy has achieved process and program success in terms of setting and
meeting all production targets, as well as establishing and promoting rapid biofuels
development in China in less than 20 years. I would like to argue that this policy success
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is because of China’s unique policy-making process, featuring specific policy goal setting
and policy evaluation every five years.
The Chinese government routinely uses a five-year goal setting strategy in all policy
areas. The whole economy of China is divided into various sectors, with specific and
quantitative policy goals set for each one. One of the advantages of this strategy is that it
is easy to evaluate whether the policy goals have been met by checking quantitative
achievements. In terms of biofuels production, every five years the central government of
China (primarily the NDRC) evaluates whether the previous production goal has been
achieved, and sets a new goal for the following five years. Through this process, the whole
country’s biofuels production has to be assessed to ensure that the next production goal is
realistic and harmonious with the country’s other strategic goals. This mechanism forces a
regular and quantitative assessment of biofuels policy objectives and policy instruments,
thus ensuring that problems can be identified and corrected before they are unmanageable.
The HIEM analysis of China’s biofuels policy demonstrates China’s rapid policy response
to problems as they emerge. Although it has been widely agreed that subsidizing cornbased ethanol is causing food prices to rise and that corn-based ethanol has a negative
return on energy invested (Searchinger et al., 2008; Solomon, Barnes, & Halvorsen, 2007),
the US is still subsidizing corn-based ethanol through various programs. These programs
include USDA Farm Bill energy title programs such as the Rural Energy for America
Program and the Bioenergy Program for Advanced Biofuels; tax breaks such as the
Alternative Fuel Vehicle Refueling Property Credit, Master Limited Partnerships, Jobs
Creation Act, and biodiesel tax credits; and various Departments of Energy and
Transportation programs (Taxpayer.net, 2013; Tyner, 2008). Instead when the Chinese
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government discovered the food price impact of using grain as a bioethanol feedstock, they
quickly responded by prohibiting the use of grain with several policies in 2006.
This policy analysis also contributes to the study of policy change through
demonstrating the following advantages of using a HIEM framework to analyze policy
regimes. First, HIEM analysis reveals horizontal relationships among policy ends and
means in various levels. Thus scholars can identify the ways in which abstract policy goals
are realized by specific targets. For example, when the Chinese government decided to
increase the production of biodiesel in a significant way (from 0.2 to 1 million tons), their
specific policy end was to build a sustainable waste cooking oil supply chain. The Chinese
government identified a bottleneck in China’s biodiesel development and aimed to resolve
it with an alternative feedstock (waste cooking oil).
Secondly, HIEM analysis demonstrated the vertical relationship among policy ends and
means within the same level, thus revealing whether the Chinese government adopted
appropriate policy means to address certain policy ends. For example, when the Chinese
government decided to expand non-grain feedstock plantations in the 2006-2010 phase,
they used policy instruments such as providing subsidies for non-grain feedstock
plantations on marginal land, and low interest loans and direct subsidies to non-grain
bioethanol plants. These instruments were effective in terms of boosting China’s non-grain
bioethanol production. Additionally, by standardizing bioethanol production (Standard
2001) and bioethanol blending with gasoline (Standard for Biotheanol for Automobiles
2001), as well as setting up pilot programs in selected cities, China successfully
incorporated bioethanol into the gasoline supply chain, thus boosting bioethanol demand
and production.
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Through analyzing policy ends and means in a historical context, the HIEM analysis
was also able to identify causality between the specific policy ends were set and the policy
instruments that were issued, thus demonstrating the interaction effects among different
historical events. For example, the HIEM analysis revealed the reason behind the Chinese
government’s sudden abandonment of grain-based bioethanol feedstock, which was the
complete consumption of stale corn in the national food reserve and the 6% raise of corn
price in China in 2006 when the plants turned to fresh corn on the market. Previous policy
analyses have used descriptive methods usually focusing only on a few policies or a certain
aspect of China’s biofuel development (Qiu et al., 2012; Xiao, Li, Shen, & Li, 2010; H.
Zhang et al., 2012), failing to provide a more complete and comprehensive understanding
of China’s biofuel policy development.
The success of China’s biofuels policy has also triggered concerns. The most recent
policy goals China set for biofuels production aims to produce 4 million tons of bioethanol
and 1 million tons of biodiesel by 2015, and 10 million tons of bioethanol and 2 million
tons of biodiesel by 2020 (“The Twelfth Five Years Strategic Plan for Renewable Energy
Development” (2012)). However, according to Qiu, Huang et al. (2010), based on suitable
arable lands for energy crops, the yield of energy crops, and the efficiency of the conversion
rate of feedstock to biofuel, at the maximum China can only produce 5 million tons of
bioethanol by 2015 and 12 million tons by 2020 (Qiu et al. 2010). Qiu, Huang et al. (2010)
further note that these production estimates do not consider water resource constraints, the
suitability of soil quality of the marginal lands for energy crops, and the cost effectiveness
of planting bioethanol feedstock. They argue that when these factors are all taken into
account, even using half of these marginal lands for bioethanol crops is already a
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challenging task for China (Qiu et al. 2010). When China’s domestic supply is not able to
meet its production goals, it is not surprising that China has turned to acquiring land and
planting biofuels crops beyond its borders. To obtain an idea of how much land would be
required to meet China’s shortfall in domestic biofuel production, we can use cassava as
an example. According to a study by Tian and Zhao 2007, on average, each hectare of land
can produce 19.5 tons of fresh cassava (Tian & Zhao, 2007), and Qiu, Huang et al. (2010)
estimated that producing 1 ton of bioethanol requires 7 tons of cassava. Therefore, to meet
the target shortfall of 1.5 million tons of bioethanol by 2015 and 4 million tons by 2020,
China would need an additional 0.53 and 1.43 million hectares of land by 2015 and 2020,
respectively. Given China’s domestic shortage of arable land, these millions of hectares
must be sought abroad.
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Chapter 2 A Political Ecology Analysis of China’s Discourse on China’s
Land Acquisition for Biofuels in Africa

2.1 Introduction

A heated debate has emerged regarding the nature of China’s recent land acquisitions
in Africa for biofuels production. Mainstream western media and scholars have claimed
that China is on an exploitative hunt for natural resources to meet its domestic
development needs, and therefore these land acquisitions in Africa are representative of
“neo-colonial exploitation” or “land grabbing” (Adem, 2010; GRAIN, 2008b; Harvey,
2005; Yan & Sautman, 2010). Others argue that China’s land acquisition is another form
of development aid to African countries, establishing ‘economic diplomacy’ or obtaining
‘soft power’ (Braeutigam & Tang, 2009; Sautman & Yan, 2007). Still other scholars take
a more neutral ground and believe it is difficult to make a conclusion yet, due to this
phenomena’s multi-layered and paradoxical nature (Hofman & Ho, 2012). Much
attention has been paid to China’s land acquisition in Africa in terms of its large scale and
fast speed (Atkin et al., 2009; GRAIN, 2008a). However, there are also counterarguments that a ‘global magnifying glass’ has been put on China’s every move in the
world (Hofman & Ho, 2012) and it is an erroneous statement that China is at the center of
large-scale farmland acquisition in developing countries (Tortajada, 2014).
The land acquired in Africa by Chinese companies can generally be divided into two
categories: land for growing food crops and land for biofuels crops. Although Chinese
cooperation with African countries on food crops has been ongoing since the 1960s
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(Braeutigam & Tang, 2009), China’s involvement in Africa for biofuels crops did not
start until 2007. Since the social, political and ecological drivers behind food and biofuels
crops can differ, and since land acquisition for biofuels crops have received less attention,
here I specifically focus on the analysis of China’s discourse on land acquisitions for
biofuels in Africa.
The debate over China’s land acquisition for biofuels production in Africa is just one
perspective of the unprecedented attention to the contemporary China-Africa relationship
in recent years. The China-Africa relationship has received academic and media interest
since Zhou Enlai’s path-breaking African tour in 1963-4 (Large, 2008 ). Among all the
China-Africa relationship studies, trade and resource extraction have generated the most
literature to date (Large, 2008 ). Resource extraction in order to meet China’s high speed
economic development is generally perceived as the primary motivation behind the
current Chinese engagement in Africa (Harvey, 2005; Large, 2008 ), which is often
viewed as a reflection of China’s commitment of neo-colonialism in Africa by Western
scholars.
Despite the wide coverage of literature on the China-Africa relationship, there
remains basic knowledge gaps about many areas of China’s expanding involvement in
Africa. Large (2008) states that “Given some of the more inflated claims about a ‘new
scramble’ or ‘new imperialism’, there is a marked gap between the perceptions and
exaggerated projections of an inexorable Chinese rise in Africa and knowledge of how
this is actually playing out” (Large, 2008 P57). In addressing this research gap, here I
provide an analysis of China’s discourse on land acquisition for biofuels production in
Africa, as well as the policy implications of the discourse. Through the discourse
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analysis, I argue that China’s foreign land acquisition for biofuels production is driven by
China’s need for energy security and alternative investment opportunities, limited biofuel
feedstock supply, and biofuel feedstock’s high investment return rate. The Chinese media
emphasizes that land acquisition for biofuels production in Africa is a win-win situation
for China and Africa, which is a reflection of the Chinese government’s new engagement
policy in Africa to switch from humanitarian aid to a more market-oriented and mutual
beneficial co-operation (Braeutigam & Tang, 2009). Even though the Chinese media
states that Chinese companies are committed to building a more sustainable Africa,
effective policies to regulate Chinese companies which acquire land for biofuels
production have not yet been advanced. This study builds on a thorough collection of
China’s domestic media products related to China’s land acquisitions in Africa.

2.2 Background

Matondi et al. (2011) believe that peak oil and climate change are the ultimate
triggers of the drive for global biofuels production. Based on studies by the US Energy
Information Administration (EIA) and the Association for the Study of Peak Oil and Gas
(ASPO), as far as oil and natural gas are concerned, the end of the fossil age is not more
than a century away (Matondi, Havnevik, & Beyene, 2011). Furthermore, data from the
International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) shows that the CO2 content of the
atmosphere is 37 per cent higher than 1750, before the industrial revolution (IPCC,
2005). The IPCC estimates that CO2 emissions from fossil fuels have contributed almost
75% of the increase in the greenhouse effect since 1850 (IPCC, 2005). Besides energy
security and climate change mitigation, rural development is also advocated as a reason
to pursue a switch from fossil fuel-based oil to biofuels (Cotula, Dyer, & Vermeulen,
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2008). It is believed that biofuels development can provide better opportunities and
employment for farmers and rural people (Cotula et al., 2008).
The concern over energy security and climate change mitigation has pushed
governments all over the world to make mandatory biofuels development targets for
replacing petroleum-based transportation fuels with biofuels (Cotula et al., 2008).
According to a study by Rothkopf (2007), 27 of 50 countries surveyed in 2007 had
enacted or had considered mandatory requirements to blend biofuels with traditional
transportation fuels, primarily in the EU, US, Brazil, China and India (Rothkopf, 2007).
Since biofuels development requires a large amount of feedstock (which in turn has large
land and irrigation requirements), the global biofuels development has generated
increasing demand for more intensive land and water use. Ironically, the governments
making the mandatory biofuels production targets are also governing areas that support
the least cultivatable land that can be used for biofuels crops without competing with
domestic food security. In Asia, Europe and North America, almost the total cultivable
area is either under cultivation or under forest (Cotula et al., 2008). Africa and South
America, on the other hand, contain 80 per cent of the world’s reserve agricultural land
(Cotula et al., 2008).
Although the exact amount of land being acquired by foreign land investors in Africa
is still unknown at this point, the numbers suggested by several studies have presented a
broadly consistent picture in terms of the significant scale of land acquisitions by foreign
investors in Africa. According to a joint study by the Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO), International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) and International
Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), since 2004, there have been 2.5 million
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hectares (ha) of land acquired by foreign investors in just five African countries:
Ethiopia, Ghana, Madagascar, Mali and Sudan (Cotula, 2009). Friis and Reenberg (2010)
found that from 2008-2010, land deals in Africa have affected between 51 and 63 million
ha of land (Friis & Reenberg, 2010). A study by the World Bank (Deininger & Byerlee,
2011) documented land acquisitions for 56.6 million ha worldwide between 2008-2009,
of which two-thirds of the land area was in Africa. Furthermore, there has been an
upward trend in both land acquisition project numbers and allocated land areas in African
countries, with predicted further growth in investments in the future (Cotula, 2009).
Land acquisition is generally intended for growing food or biofuels crops. Thus it is
not surprising that as more countries (including the US, EU, China, India and Brazil)
make policies requiring mandatory targets for use of biofuels in transportation fuels and
create guaranteed markets for biofuels, more land in Africa is targeted for growing
biofuels crops to meet this growing demand. European countries have been identified as
dominant players in land acquisition for biofuels (Cotula, 2012), however China is an
emerging power that cannot be ignored.
Even though the biofuels production industry started only 20 years ago in China, its
development is notable with respect to the speed at which it has developed (Figure 1). In
less than 20 years, China has become the world’s third largest country in biofuels
production after Brazil and the US, and has routinely surpassed its five-year production
goals. According to “The Twelfth Five Years Strategic Plan for Renewable Energy
Development” (2012), China is aiming to make renewable energy satisfy 11.4% of total
energy consumption in 2015. In order to reach this goal, China will produce 4 million
tons of bioethanol and 1 million tons of biodiesel by 2015 (NEA, 2012). The Chinese
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government is also looking to expand the production of biofuels even further in the future
so that renewable energy will account for 15% of total energy consumption by 2020,
which means that China will produce 10 million tons of bioethanol and 2 million tons of
biodiesel by 2020 (NEA, 2012).
As a country with a large population and limited arable land, China is concerned that
biofuels development may compete with food crops, having significant negative impacts
on food security. Therefore, Chinese policy requires that biofuels crops can be grown only
on ‘marginal land’. According to a study by Qiu and Huang et al. (2012), China has about
6.67 million ha of marginal land, mainly located in Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang. However,
in terms of the productivity of marginal land and the efficiency of the conversion rate of
feedstocks to biofuels (Qiu et al., 2010; Qiu et al., 2012; Tian & Zhao, 2007), it was
concluded that at maximum, China can produce 12 million tons by 2020 (Qiu et al., 2010).
Qiu et al. (2010) further note that these production estimates do not consider water resource
constraints, the suitability of soil quality of the marginal lands for energy crops, or the cost
effectiveness of planting bioethanol feedstock. They argue that when these factors are all
taken into account, even bringing half of these marginal lands into production for
bioethanol crops represents a challenging task for China (Qiu et al., 2010), which means
that China will only be able to produce 6 million tons of bioethanol by 2020, a 4 million
ton shortfall.
China’s biodiesel production is facing a similar situation. As of 2011, China had
approximately 50 small-scale production plants. Even though the total production capacity
potential of these plants is 3 million tons, the real production amount was only 0.8 million
tons. The main reason for this is due to unreliable raw material supplies, the main obstacle
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to China’s biodiesel industry (Y. Zhang et al., 2012). Unless a sustainable and robust
supply chain can be established, it is not expected that China can make its biodiesel
production target for 2020.
From the above discussion, it is clear that it will be challenging for China to meet its
biofuels production targets using its domestic marginal land. Therefore, it is not
surprising that China has joined various foreign investors and acquired land in South
Asia, Latin America and Africa to grow biofuels crops. Since 2007, three Chinese
companies, ZTE, Sunshine Kadi and Julong Group, have acquired land from the
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Zambia and an undisclosed African country
separately (Table 1).
In 2007, ZTE, a formerly state-owned Chinese company announced that it would
invest $1 billion to acquire 3 million hectares land in the DRC to grow oil palm.
Possessing abundant fertile land and water, DRC has only cultivated 20% of its arable
land (Reisinger, 2012). However, the DRC’s land law is not adapted to the country’s
customs and traditions and the DRC’s governmental and institutional structures are weak,
lacking proper regulations and policies to protect its citizens’ rights (Reisinger, 2012).
This suggests that the government is not in a position to assure that foreign land leases
will not be detrimental to its citizens or the environment. Unfortunately, more details
regarding this transaction are not available, since both the Congolese government and
Chinese investors have restricted any further information about this project (Reisinger,
2012).
According to GRAIN’s 2010 report, Wuhan Kaidi planned to invest 2 million ha in
Zambia to grow Jatropha in 2009, but the project was called off due to local
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communities’ opposition. However, a press release (MOFCOM, 2011) indicated that in
2011 Kaidi announced it had established Kaidi Bio Zambia Corporation and would invest
$5.74 billion in Zambia for biofuels development. The whole project will move forward
in four phases. The first phase’s investment will be $450 million. It is expected that the
first phase will start operating by 2017 and is expected to hire more than ten thousand
local workers.
In a press release, Julong Group announced that it would start investing in Africa by
planting 500,000 ha of oil palm for biofuels (People.cn, 2014). In order to expand its
business in Africa, Julong has established representative offices in four countries
including Liberia, Cameroon, Ghana, and Kenya. Unfortunately which country the
plantation will be established in was not disclosed.
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Table 2.1: Chinese Companies’ Land Acquisition for Biofuels Deals in Africa
Time
Host
Chinese
Size
Biofuel
Status
Country
Company (hectare)
Crop
Name
Type
2007 Democratic
ZTE
3 million oil palm 0.2 million hectares have
Republic of International
been planted
Congo
(DRC)
2009
Zambia
Sunshine
2 million cassava,
Project was called off
Kadi New
corn and
due to Zambian
Energy
soybean opposition in 2012, but
Group
resumed in 2014.
(Sunshine
Kadi)
2014 One of the
Julong
0.5
oil palm
Representative offices
four
Group
million
have been established
countries:
Liberia,
Cameroon,
Ghana,
Kenya

2.3 Theoretical Background

Political ecology examines the political dynamics surrounding material and discursive
struggles over the environment in the Third World (Bryant, 1998). It is a useful
framework that traces the causation of environmental degradation to broader systems,
especially political systems. Ariza-Montobbio et al. (2010) argued that external structures
such as state institutions, global markets, peak oil and the price of energy, frame the
incentive structures that motivate certain actors to promote new energy crops. White and
Dasgupta (2010) stated that the global trend of agro-fuel expansion is driven by the need
for investing countries to find a quick fix to their energy and environmental security
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problems, as well as the search for corporate capital, and by the attempt of hosting
countries to find new ways to revive rural and agrarian development.
Harvey (2005) made the argument that over the past thirty years, China has focused
on its path toward ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ or, as some call it
‘privatization with Chinese characteristics’ (Harvey, 2005). During this process, China
constructed a form of state-manipulated market economy that achieved phenomenal
economic growth rates, averaging close to 10% a year. This rapid growth has two
implications for China’s land acquisition activity in Africa. First, as Chinese companies
have successfully accumulated a large amount of capital, they now require an external
investment outlet for their internally accumulated surpluses (Harvey, 2005). Chinese
businesses have started to expand their scope of investment globally since the mid-1990s.
Second, China’s dramatic growth has made it increasingly dependent upon foreign
sources of raw materials and energy (Harvey, 2005). China’s demand for oil, metal,
agricultural imports, forest products, and other natural resources has changed the global
economy and market structure. For example, China’s mass imports of soy beans from
Brazil and Argentina has provided a significant boost to those nation’s economies
(Harvey, 2005). Given China’s demand for energy and the economic power it has, it can
be expected that China’s land acquisition for biofuel production will significantly
influence the ecosystems, communities and even political dynamics in throughout the
African continent.
The role of unequal power relations in constituting a politicized environment is a
central theme of political ecology (Bryant, 1998). The unequal power relations can be
reflected in conflicting perceptions, discourse, and knowledge claims about development
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and ecological processes (Bryant, 1998). In this way, actors in power often have more
control over knowledge and forms of representing reality, therefore suppressing
alternative forms of values expressed by local communities and indigenous groups
(Ariza-Montobbio, Lele, Kallis, & Martinez-Alier, 2010). White and Dasgupta (2010)
point out that agro-fuels uniquely obtain a “convenient green packaging” as alternative
fuels emphasized by investing countries, which makes corporate large-scale land
acquisition and forest conversion less likely to be suspected to cause negative
environmental and social impacts (Ariza-Montobbio et al., 2010; White & Dasgupta,
2010).
Discourse analysis is a common research method used to discover the perceptions of
and knowledge claims made by alternative energy investing countries. Ariza-Montobbio
et al. (2010) analyzed the discourse promoting Jatropha cultivation in India and found
that even though national and state policy discourses describe Jatropha as a “pro-poor”
and “pro-wasteland” development crop, the field work on Jatropha plantations shows
that Jatropha cultivation favors resource-rich farmers, while reinforcing existing
processes of marginalization of small and subsistence farmers. In a political ecology
analysis of the US’s sugarcane bioethanol production in Latin America, Hollander (2010)
describes the way in which the US government, domestic and transnational corporations,
growers and consumers formed a dominant discourse that sugarcane bioethanol is critical
for US energy independence and is environmentally friendly. Concurrently, they
downplayed the concerns over the concentration of ownership and control of the sugar
industry and the expansion of monoculture, with an associated increase in landlessness,
rural poverty and food insecurity (Hollander, 2010).
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2.4 Research Method

The primary research method of this study is an analysis of China’s news media
articles on the issue of China’s land acquisition for biofuels production in Africa. Using a
discourse analytical approach, I explored the dominant knowledge regimes constructed
and conceived by Chinese public media in their sociopolitical context. To this end, this
article bases its argument on data drawn from electronic news reports found by the most
well-established news search engine in China: news.baidu.com. News.baidu.com does
not provide news reports, rather it provides free access to news reports on the internet
provided by electronic newspapers and public websites. It does not include blogs, forums
and private websites. The search engine features an advanced search function, which
allows users to enter specific date periods and single or multiple keywords to find news
reports on the Internet. Although China’s communist media system has been eroded by
the introduction of a market economy in recent years, the press in China is still largely
influenced by the government (Wei Wang, 2008). Therefore, data collected through this
channel largely reflects the Chinese government’s positions and attitudes concerning
China’s land acquisitions in Africa.
The data collection process began with searching on news.baidu.com for news reports
that involved various combinations of the following keywords: outward investment and
cooperation (ሩཆᣅ䍴㓿⍾ਸ), Sino-Africa cooperation (ѝ䶎ਸ), Africa (䶎⍢),
biofuels (⭏⢙⏢փ⟳ᯉ), overseas (⎧ཆ), Oil Palm (ἅᾸ), Jatropha (哫仾ṁ), Zambia (
䎎∄ӊ), DRC (ࡊ᷌), ZTE (ѝ )ޤand Kaidi (ࠟ䘚) . The time frame of the search was
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set from 2007 to 2014, since China’s land acquisition for biofuels in Africa did not start
until 2007. The resulting news dataset was comprised of different genres of news
discourse: opinion pieces, features and hard news. The variety of data allowed this study
to trace the same theme within a cross-section of genres. The search results were then
identified one by one in terms of its relevance to China’s land acquisition for biofuels
production in Africa. This was carried out by employing the following criteria: First, the
news report had to be related to Sino-Africa economic investment or cooperation; second,
if the news report was specifically regarding food crops, it was eliminated. The 53 reports
(Appendix 1) that passed the selection constituted the effective samples for this study.
The whole data set was loaded into Atlas.ti software. Atlas is a software widely used
in qualitative data analysis and research. It helps qualitative researchers to organize vast
amount of data, code original data sources, and keep track of interrelations among coding
themes and sub-coding themes. Before the coding started, according to Williams et al.
(1990) and Miles and Huberman (1994)’s suggestion, the following initial general themes
were created from the literature review: Chinese public’s views toward Africa (View),
Sino-Africa relationship (Relationship), Chinese government’s role (Government),
Drivers of China’s land acquisition for biofuels in Africa (Drivers), and sustainability
issues in land acquisition in Africa (Sustainability). As the coding progressed, the
following new coding themes emerged: Western countries’ accusation against China in
terms of land grabbing (Accusation), other countries’ land grabbing activities in Africa
(Other Countries), the perceived situation of China’s land acquisition for biofuels in
Africa (Situation), and China’s strategic plan related to land acquisition for biofuels in
Africa (Plan). Therefore, in total nine coding themes were identified after the coding
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process. All codes were organized as ‘code families’ in Atlas.ti according to the coding
themes they belong to. In the next stage, codes in each coding theme were reviewed a
second time, and sub-coding themes were identified (Table 2). I then generated a report
from Atlas. The report organizes contents of the news articles coded by me according to
the coding and sub-coding themes under which they were categorized. When conducting
my data analysis, I was able to easily access the data in my coding themes and subcoding themes to support the following arguments.
Table 2.2 Coding Themes and Sub-Coding Themes
Coding Themes

Sub-Coding Themes
Accusation

Accusation
Argument
Energy security
Biofuels development goal
Driver

Limited domestic biofuels material supply
Palm oil’s high return rate
Domestic investment market competition
Policy support

Government

Information and service provision
Regulating overseas investment

Other Countries
Plan

Countries who are acquiring land in Africa
Impacts to African people
Acquiring land in Africa for biofuel
History
Relationship

Current
Future
ZTE

Situation

Kaidi
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Other
Sustainability issues
Sustainability

Perception of sustainability
China’s contribution to sustainability
Africa

View

Biofuels development
China’s land acquisition in Africa

2.5 Results

From the data, it is clear that the Chinese public media generally supports the idea of
investing land for biofuels crops in Africa. The main reason claimed by the Chinese
public media is that it is a win-win situation for both China and African countries,
contributing to the sustainable development goals of African countries as well as helping
China’s energy security and economic development. In order to support this claim, the
Chinese media made statements that African countries have a great desire and potential to
develop biofuels industries, but are not making much progress so far due to capital and
technology limitations, which Chinese companies can provide. In addition, the Chinese
public media reported intensively about the way in which China has been providing
various kinds of support to African countries in the past, as well as Chinese companies
are helping local communities in Africa currently. The Chinese public media constantly
prods the Chinese government to provide more support to help Chinese companies’
further involvement in land acquisitions in Africa. In addition, from the news reports, the
drivers behind China’s land acquisitions as well as China’s attitude toward Africa were
discovered.
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Drivers Behind China’s Land Acquisition for Biofuels
Overall, four drivers behind China’s land acquisitions in Africa were summarized from
the data. These drivers included: 1) energy security; 2) limited domestic biofuels crops
supply; 3) biofuels feedstock’s high investment return rate; and 4) additional investment
opportunities for Chinese companies.
The Chinese public media is aware that China relies heavily on imported oil, which
places China’s economic development at risk as global petroleum oil reserves are
decreasing and oil prices are increasing. A news report by Bioon.com cited Yuanchun
Shi, a member of the Chinese National Academy of Science, stating that “China’s
consumption of petroleum oil is raising in a high speed. … China’s reliance on imported
oil is currently 50%, which is a huge burden to China’s economic development. … the
best alternative energy is biofuels instead of wind, solar or nuclear energy (Bioon.com,
2008).” Biofuels development is clearly essential to China’s energy security. In addition,
Chinese public media is concerned about the sources from which China imports
petroleum oil. According to a news article, over ninety percent of China’s imported oil
was transported by sea through the Strait of Hormuz or Malacca, which are both in the
control of the U.S. Should anything happen between the US and China, or should severe
terrorism occur along the transportation routes, China’s oil imports would be severely
impacted (Cableabc.com, 2014). On the other hand, African countries, for example DRC,
Tanzania and Zambia, generally have good relationships with China. Therefore, the
Chinese media argues that growing biofuels crops in Africa will provide a more stable
source of energy for China. In several news reports, it has been suggested that China
should work with African countries to exchange China’s capital and technology with
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Africa’s land for future biofuels development (China Economic Network, 2009; Chinese
Economic Herald, 2011).
The Chinese media also realized that China’s biofuels development has a critical
bottleneck, which is the limited availability of biofuels crops. According to the China
Economic Herald, currently the two most suitable biofuel crops for China are sweet
sorghum and cassava. However, “China has limited arable land for planting sweet sorghum
and cassava, far from meeting the need of biofuels development” (Chinese Economic
Herald, 2011). The China Economic Network (2009) gave more detailed information
stating that “(China’s) arable land has decreased to 1.827 billion acres totally and 1.39 acre
per capita, which is only one third of global average. In the meanwhile, water resources are
limited, with more than half of land not having enough irrigation. In addition, urbanization
in recent years is occupying larger amounts of land. Thus China needs to import a large
quantity of cassava (China Economic Network, 2009).” In order to resolve this issue, the
Chinese Economic Herald (2011) suggested that the Chinese government should
“encourage Chinese companies to go overseas to grow sweet sorghum and cassava, and
produce bioethanol out of these materials in African local factories” (Chinese Economic
Herald, 2011). The China Economic Network (2009) made similar statements that China
should purchase or lease land in nations which have more abundant arable land and
resources, such as the DRC, Ghana and Ethiopia, to grow biofuel crops (China Economic
Network, 2009).
The Chinese public media has also been promoting the idea that acquiring land in
Africa is a great investment opportunity for Chinese companies. In recent years, Chinese
companies have been facing increasingly tough domestic investment and market
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competition, and thus are turning to overseas markets for additional investment
opportunities. Biofuels, as a promising alternative to petroleum, have high potential for
investment return. In a news article regarding ZTE’s overseas investment for oil palm
growth, ZTE CEO Weigui Hou stated “biofuels will become ZTE’s future profit growth
point” (Jia, 2008). ZTE picked oil palm as the biofuel crop grown overseas because palm
oil is the most demanded vegetable oil globally and the profit rate can reach as high as 60
per cent (Jia, 2008). Thus investing in biofuels overseas is becoming a new strategy for
Chinese companies for diversifying investment and generating cash flow. The three
companies acquiring land for biofuel crops in Africa (ZTE, Kaidi and Julong) are all
public companies, whose primary goal of going to Africa is to obtain investment
opportunities and benefits. They basically make their own decisions in terms of which
kinds of biofuel crops to plant according to their understanding about the global biofuel
market. Their investment strategies follow Chinese policy mainly because the companies
see the targets as profit opportunities, not because the companies are implementing
government policy.
Government’s Role
From the data, it was observed that the Chinese government plays a critical role in
land acquisition in Africa, even though the three Chinese companies currently acquiring
land in Africa are privately owned. Given China’s centrally-planned-economy, a land
acquisition deal is not totally a company’s own investment decision, but it has to fit into
the Chinese government’s overall global investment strategic plan to obtain support from
the government. In a news article, it was reported that the Vice Minister of Ministry of
Agriculture (MOA) has shown support to ZTE’s land acquisition for palm oil in DRC,
Ͷ

promising to include ZTE into the Chinese government’s “Going Global” strategy; thus
MOA along with MOC will work with ZTE to promote its overseas land acquisition (Jia,
2008). What’s more, the Chinese media reports intensively about the government’s
involvement in land acquisition, including policy and financial support, as well as
information and service provision. For example, ifeng.com reported that the Chinese
Ambassador in DRC, Yingwu Wang, promised that the Chinese government will make a
full effort to help Chinese companies’ overseas development (Fan & Zhang, 2012). The
MOC has been issuing ‘Overseas Investment Guidance by Countries’ since 2009. The
2014 guidance covers over 166 countries and areas, including each country’s political,
economic, social, legal and cultural information (ifeng.com, 2014). In addition, a press
release by the MOC stated that it would make a five-year overseas investment strategic
plan to provide guidance to Chinese companies, by indicating the main countries and
industries that the Chinese government would support (sina.com, 2014). The news article
also suggested that the MOC will make laws to protect Chinese companies’ overseas
investment, provide investment information and public service, as well as request data
from Chinese companies (sina.com, 2014).
Sino -Africa Relationship
When reporting about China’s investment in Africa, the Chinese media often
emphasizes the good political relationship between China and Africa historically, as well
as assistance that China has been providing to African countries (Fan & Zhang, 2012;
Gao, 2014; Wen Wang, 2013). For example, a news report quoted Chinese Prime
Minister Keqiang Li’s position when talking about Sino-Africa relations that “you will
never forget someone who has cried with you”, showing the close relationship between
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China and Africa (Gao, 2014). In addition, the Chinese media reported that China has
provided the DRC with over $300,000 aid in the past 40 years, and helped the DRC to
build railroads, roads, hospitals, schools, and factories (Fan & Zhang, 2012).
Power relations
The Chinese media asserts that both China and Africa are trying to develop their
economies to become stronger players on the global stage. One news report said “The
African dream is to become an equal, united, stable and rich Africa, which is the same
idea as China wants to revive to become a strong and rich nation” (Wen Wang, 2013).
Even though China will eventually seek political and military power, at this stage, China
is trying to obtain stronger economic power. In addition, the Chinese public media
believes that China has superior economic power to African countries. The Chinese
media describe Africa in terms of “low agricultural productivity”, “poor infrastructure”
and “weak industrial base” (ChineseEmbassy.org, 2014); on the other hand, they believe
China has “advantages in capital, technology, and professional
labor”(ChineseEmbassy.org, 2014). Therefore, they believe Africa needs China and
China can use these advantages to “help” African countries’ economic development.
Win-Win Situation
When the Chinese media reported about China’s land acquisitions for biofuel
production in Africa, there was a constant use of the phrase “win-win” for both China and
Africa. For example, in a news report, the China Economic Herald (2011) stated that the
African continent has a large amount of land available which is suitable for growing
biofuels crops; therefore, China should export biofuel-manufacturing technology to
Africa to help local communities to explore agricultural resources and establish a biofuels
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industry, which would be a win-win result (China Economic Herald, 2011). The China
Economic Herald further stated that “while China can obtain clean biofuel, African
countries can also use biofuel crops as food, … This model can help local peasants by
raising their income and improving their living standard. When they experience the
benefits brought by Chinese companies, they will voluntarily protect the mines developed
by Chinese companies, thus strengthening China’s interest in Africa and building a long–
term African strategic plan” (China Economic Herald, 2011).
The Chinese media argued that China’s biofuels development is facing some
bottlenecks, including high biofuel feedstock collection cost and limited land availability
(China Economic Herald, 2011). In order to overcome the bottlenecks, the news report
gave some suggestions, and one of them was to encourage corporations to go overseas to
plant or purchase biofuel crops and produce biofuels (China Economic Herald, 2011).
The Chinese media maintained that acquiring land in Africa to grow biofuels crops “can
provide China with clean biofuel, … which fits China’s long term strategic plan in
Africa, … thus China can not only use Africa’s resources more efficiently, but also
establish a market base for the future, … speeding up China’s economic development”
(China Economic Herald, 2011).
In addition, the Chinese media repeatedly emphasized the great investment
opportunities in Africa. News365 quoted African Union Commission (AUC) Chairperson
Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma as saying that the “Africa era has come!” (News365.com,
2013). According to the Chinese media, in recent years sub-Saharan Africa has
maintained a high economic growth rate and low inflation rate, and thus will become one
of the global economic growth engines (News365.com, 2013). Six out of the ten
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countries that have the highest GDP growth rate are in Africa (Hexun.com, 2013). Behind
the high economic growth rate is the need for capital investment. According to
News365.com (2013), Africa will need 90 billion to 100 billion USD for building
infrastructure. Therefore, the Chinese media encouraged Chinese companies to invest in
Africa. China.com described Africa as a “rich and shallow mine, which needs global
investors and labors’ exploration … this gives adventurous Chinese people endless
opportunities” (Wen Wang, 2013).
A common view of the Chinese media toward Africa is that generally Africa has a
large amount of uncultivated land and abundant water resources, with low agricultural
productivity. Songtian Lin, the Director of Department of African Affairs in the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, made a similar statement in a speech. He said “Africa’s cultivated
land only accounts for 27.3% of arable land. Its agricultural infrastructure is behind and
productivity is low. Most African countries are still at the stage of traditional agriculture
and cannot support themselves (ChineseEmbassy.org, 2014).” The Chinese media
reported that since 2007, many African countries have started to develop biofuels
industries. These countries include Zambia, South Africa, Kenya, Ghana, the DRC,
Senegal and Nigeria. Among these countries, the DRC established a special committee
for developing biofuels (People.cn, 2008). Zambian peasants have already planted over
200 thousand acres of land in biofuels crops under the support of a British company (Not
named in the report) (People.cn, 2008). However, the Chinese media believe that
Africa’s biofuels development overall is facing great challenges, such as a lack of
infrastructure and professional laborers, and low agricultural production level
(Bioon.com, 2009). The Chinese media argue that China’s investment in Africa can help
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African countries, because of China’s advantage in capital, technology and professional
labor (Fan & Zhang, 2012). The Chinese Ambassador to the DRC Yingwu Wang made
the statement that “most of Chinese companies’ overseas investment projects were
supported by the Export-Import Bank of China or China Development Bank, thus having
abundant capital support” (Fan & Zhang, 2012). In addition, Yingwu Wang believed
China has advanced industrial technology that is suitable for African development, as
well as highly educated professionals who are adventurous and work hard (Fan & Zhang,
2012). Furthermore, the Chinese media believes that China’s land investment in biofuels
can help African countries to resolve their energy shortage issue. Wuhan Kaidi (2014)
reported that currently over 70 percent of Zambia’s energy came from forests, thus
causing deforestation at the speed of 300 thousand hectares annually. Therefore, the
Zambian government hopes that the investment of African Kaidi Biofuels Zambia LLC
can help mitigate this energy shortage situation (Science and Technology World, 2014).
In a press release about ZTE Agriculture’s land investment for biofuels in the DRC, it is
also mentioned that ZTE’s investment for oil palm in DRC will help it meet its demand
for both palm oil and biodiesel, thus reducing the DRC’s reliance on imported gasoline
and diesel (Liu, 2009).
Other benefits the Chinese media believes that African countries will gain from
Chinese companies’ investment are employment and training opportunities. Xinhuanet
reported that “overseas localization”, which means to hire local employees in overseas
branches, has become ZTE’s focus of “capacity building” in Africa, with over 30 percent
of employees hired locally (Y. Wang & Song, 2014). In a news report about ZTE’s
investment in an oil palm plantation in the DRC, it is mentioned that a planter would hire
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thousands of local employees (Liu, 2009). In addition, it is reported that when ZTE was
developing its tele-communication business in Africa, it made an effort to gain the trust
of African countries by establishing orphanage shelters, building training centers, and
providing local college students with internship opportunities in various African countries
(Y. Wang & Song, 2014).

2.6 Discussion

There has been much debate about the nature of China’s land acquisition for biofuels
in Africa. Is this an action of neocolonialism by China or it is a win-win situation as
claimed by the Chinese government and media? Scholars have agreed that this distinction
depends on whether the land acquisition deals mitigate negative environmental and social
impacts, while optimizing economic benefits for the host country (Robertson & PinstrupAndersen, 2010).
In the emerging global land acquisition literature, scholars have found that biofuels
have the potential to generate both macro and micro benefits for host countries (Hallam,
2009). On a macro level, biofuels development can: bring capital investment and
technology transfer into host countries; provide employment opportunities, skills
development and secondary industries; and generate income from lease rent and tax
collection (Cotula et al., 2008; Hallam, 2009, 2011; Robertson & Pinstrup-Andersen,
2010). On a micro level, biofuels development can: revitalize land use and livelihoods in
rural areas; increase income for small-scale farmers; secure real, long-term poverty
reduction in countries that have a high dependence on agricultural commodities; and
improve rural infrastructure (Cotula, 2009; Cotula et al., 2008; Robertson & PinstrupAndersen, 2010). While the potential benefits can make land acquisition for biofuels a
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development opportunity for host countries, there are also risks associated with the
investment. If the risks are left unaddressed, they can prevent the actualization of this
development opportunity for host countries. In many cases, biofuels development is
associated with negative environmental and social impacts (Cotula et al., 2008; GRAIN,
2008a; Obidzinski, Andriani, Komanidin, & Andrianto, 2012). A study by Obidzinski et
al. (2012) in three oil palm plantations in South Asia showed that plantation
establishment at all three sites caused deforestation, resulting in significant negative
impacts such as water pollution, soil erosion and air pollution (Obidzinski et al., 2012). In
addition, the study also observed that traditional landowners have experienced
restrictions on traditional land use rights and land losses, along with increasing land
scarcity, rising land prices, and land conflicts (Obidzinski et al., 2012).
It is both the host and investor country’s responsibility to ensure that land acquisition
deals are contributing to sustainability in African countries. For international investors, it
is recommended that before investing in land for biofuel prouction, they should
understand the communities whose land they are acquiring. Land without legal titles is
not necessary unoccupied. Land not cultivated might have significant cultural and
religious meaning for the community. Also, investors should minimize negative
environmental and social impacts in local communities, try to avoid displacement, meet
the demands of evicted farmers, and try to create employment opportunities for local
people (Hallam, 2011; Robertson & Pinstrup-Andersen, 2010).
There have been multiple international sustainability initiatives that can be applied to
regulate global land acquisition for biofuels, including the Roundtable for Sustainable
Biofuels (RSB) as well as the “Principles for responsible agricultural investment that
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respects rights, livelihoods and resources (the Seven Principles)” developed by the World
Bank, UNCTAD and IFAD. The aims of both initiatives are to guide biofuels
development, both domestic and global, to contribute to sustainable development,
especially emphasizing social and environmental sustainability. The RSB includes 12
principles: legality; planning, monitoring and continuous improvement; greenhouse gas
emissions; human and labor rights; rural and social development; local food security;
conservation of soil, water and air; use of technology, inputs and management of waste;
and land rights (Roundtable on Sustainable Biofuels (RSB), 2009). The Seven Principles
include 1) Respect for land and resource rights; 2) Ensuring food security and rural
development; 3) Ensuring transparency, good governance, and a proper enabling
environment; 4) Consultation and participation; 5) Responsible agro-enterprise investing;
6) Social sustainability; and 7) Environmental sustainability (World Bank, 2010).
When the factors recognized by scholars and principles adopted by international
initiatives are applied to analyze China’s discourse on land acquisition for biofuels in
Africa, it can be concluded that the Chinese government and companies are making some
effort to address some of the responsibilities and principles mentioned above, including
providing employment to local people, rural and social development, and somewhat to
social sustainability. Unfortunately at this point, it is still premature to determine whether
China is truly contributing to Africa’s sustainable development or not. On the one hand,
from the discourse analysis, the Chinese public media has been mainly emphasizing the
economic benefits to Africa from China’s biofuels development there, without addressing
possible negative social and environmental impacts due to China’s investment. In fact,
one interesting finding is that when the Chinese media reports about negative
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environmental and social impacts, they are always associated with other countries’ land
acquisition. Even though some efforts on social sustainability have been reported, it is
still not clear what the attitudes of the Chinese public media (also the Chinese
government) are towards land rights, human rights, and stakeholder involvement, which
are top concerns of international development scholars. Also, even though the discourse
shows some evidence that the Chinese government would like to contribute to food
security and environmental sustainability, more data are needed to show the way in which
this attitude is implemented on the ground.

2.7 Policy Implications

The above discourse of the Chinese public media toward land acquisition for biofuels
in Africa is correlated with China’s policy on land acquisition for biofuels generally
(Table 2.3). This should not be surprising since the Chinese media remains closely
monitored by the government, despite the recent reform on media (Stockmann &
Gallagher, 2011). Since the late 1970s, the Chinese media has experienced a reform,
turning from one hundred percent state owned and financed by the state to
commercialized and partially privatized (Stockmann & Gallagher, 2011). The Chinese
media was encouraged to self-finance with advertising revenues, though still receives
indirect or direct subsidies from the state (Stockmann & Gallagher, 2011). However, the
Chinese government still exerts a great deal of control over the Chinese media. The
Chinese government owns at least 51% of all Chinese public media. In addition, a
Propaganda Department has the authority to give editorial guidelines, and even to dismiss
personnel (Stockmann & Gallagher, 2011). Given these facts, it can be expected that the
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Chinese media’s discourse on land acquisition for biofuel production in Africa will be
highly correlated with Chinese government policy on the issue.
In recent years, the Chinese government has issued ten policies that can be applied to
Chinese companies’ land acquisition for biofuels in Africa. Among the ten policies, six of
them (policy 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, Table 2.3) provide various forms of financial support
including direct funding, subsidizing interest on credit, as well as tax reductions and
exemptions. These support programs demonstrate that the Chinese government has
realized the importance of overseas investments to the Chinese economy, and is
promoting Chinese companies’ overseas investment in agriculture, just as the public
media suggested. On the other hand, policy number 8 (Table 2.3) states that it has been
realized that there are problems in China’s overseas investments, including labor conflicts
(especially related to local employees), environmental protection issues, and worker
safety issues. Therefore, this policy requires that Chinese companies investing overseas
must follow the host countries’ regulations about environmental protection and labor
rights. In addition, companies are required to create employment opportunities for local
people, as well as respect local cultural traditions. In this policy, the concept of ‘win-win’
is mentioned as the principle of operation for Chinese companies when committing to
overseas investment.
Policy number 1 (Table 2.3) provides an appraisal method to evaluate the
performance of Chinese overseas investment companies through five aspects: profit,
solvency, asset quality, development capability and social contribution. Thus it is clear
that the performance of Chinese companies’ overseas investment is evaluated mainly
according to their economic performance. One factor to be mentioned is social
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contributions. While it seems that this factor will consider the social impact of Chinese
companies’ overseas investment, according to the policy, the indexes used to measure
‘social contribution’ include: tax contribution, foreign exchange obtained, amount and
value of natural resources obtained, and net asset growth rate. Thus it shows that the
‘social contribution’ is still mainly about economic impact.
Table 2.3 China’s Policies Related to Land Acquisition for Biofuels in Africa
Number
1
2
3

4
5
6
7

8

9

10

Name

Date

Agency

Overseas investment integrated
performance appraisal method (temporary)

10/1/2002

MOFTEC

Temporary method for annual inspection
of overseas investments
Several opinions on encouraging and
guiding individual private and nonpublicly owned companies
Registration system for overseas China
companies and organizations
Circular on strengthening financial support
to significant overseas projects
Management method for outward economy
and technology cooperation special fund
Notification on questions related to the
supporting policies for outward economy
and technology cooperation special funds
Circular on regulating the overseas
investment and cooperation of Chinese
companies
Guidance document on income tax
reduction and exception of overseas
investing companies
Several opinions regarding encouraging
and guiding private companies’ overseas
investment

10/31/2002

MOFTEC, SAFE

2/19/2005

State Council

9/14/2005

MOFCOM

09/25/2005

NDRC, CDB

12/9/2005

MOF, MOFCOM

5/8/2006

MOF, MOFCOM

6/6/2008

MOFCOM, MFS,
State Council,
SASAC

7/2/2010

SAT

6/29/2012

NDRC

2.8 Conclusion

The Chinese biofuel industry has achieved rapid development in the past 20 years.
However, this rapid development, driven by production goals as policy goals, and
ͷ

increasing concerns for food security, has driven the Chinese government to encourage
Chinese companies to acquire land for biofuel production in Africa. This encouragement
has been strengthened by the companies’ view of biofuels as a highly rewarding
investment option and promising alternative energy source to replace petroleum oil.
The dominant discourse of China concerning land acquisition for biofuels in Africa
thus predominantly views it as a “win-win” situation, exchanging China’s capital,
technology and professional labor with Africa’s land and water. When reporting about
China’s land acquisition for biofuels in Africa, the Chinese media mainly focuses on
economic benefits that African countries gained from China’s investment, with some
attention to social benefits. This reflects the Chinese government’s attitude towards
power. Since the 1970s, the Chinese government has been focusing on developing its
economic power domestically. As China has grown its economy to a size comparable
with the US and EU, China gained more global political and military power. China sees
its path of development and global standing as a successful model that can be adopted in
Africa.
At this point, it is still premature to conclude whether China is committing neocolonialism in Africa by investing in land for biofuel. Chinese companies are overseas
primarily for making profit; however, because Chinese companies (even private
companies) are supervised closely by the Chinese government, even when investing
overseas, they have to follow certain restrictions made by the government and make sure
that their operations overseas will not damage the Chinese government’s international
image. The Chinese government cares about the accusation of ‘neocolonialism’. In order
to avoid this accusation, the Chinese government has been promoting the discourse of
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‘win-win’, and policy (Policy No. 8) requires Chinese companies to pay attention to
sustainability when investing overseas. I would like to argue that, in order to make sure
that the policies (especially the ones protecting environmental and social sustainability)
are implemented, a third party monitoring system should be established by the Chinese
government in African local communities.
My study provides Chinese policy makers with a systematic analysis of the Chinese
public media’s discourse, as well as a review of policies on China’s land acquisition for
biofuel production in Africa. The Chinese government has always maintained that it’s
investments in Africa are to assist Africa’s development. If Chinese policy makers would
like to avoid the accusation of neo-colonialism, more policies must aim to mitigate the
environmental and social impacts while optimizing economic benefits. There must be
more attention on human rights, land rights and stakeholder involvement, which have not
been specifically covered in Chinese policies to date.
For African people and policy-makers, my study illustrates the way the Chinese
public media view them, as well as the approach the Chinese government adopted when
entering their communities. African policy makers are reminded that they need to make
and enforce appropriate local and national policies to protect their people and
environment, because the Chinese government may have goals that do not mesh with
those of the African communities in which Chinese companies operate.
For global development academics, my study provides an empirical study of the
current China-Africa relationship and contributes a case study to the field of political
ecology. China’s land acquisition for biofuels in Africa is only one aspect of the current
China-Africa relationship, which has attracted attention and intensive study from global
ͷͻ

scholars. My study shows the way in which China’s investment in Africa has changed
from a pure aid approach from the 1960s, to a more market oriented one. Chinese
companies are there primarily for making profits, instead of providing aid to Africa. In
addition, my study also shows the way in which one country’s political and economic
dynamic can impact on another country’s environment. It shows the way in which
alternative energy investments can be linked to sustainability goals (and lack thereof), for
example by arguing that investments contribute to a win-win situation and broader
sustainable development goals.
Currently, little systematic study has been conducted regarding the operation of
Chinese companies when acquiring land for biofuels in Africa, thus it is difficult to make
an objective conclusion about the nature of Chinese companies’ activities there. To have
a more comprehensive understanding about the nature of China’s land acquisition for
biofuels in Africa, more studies in African local communities in which Chinese
companies are active will be needed.
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Appendix 1 Table A1.1 China’s Biofuel Policies Issued from 1996 to 2014
English Name of Policy
Chinese Name
China’s Ninth Five-Year Economic and Society Development ѝॾӪ≁઼ޡഭഭ≁㓿⍾઼⽮Պਁኅㅜ
Plan and Vision Goal
ҍњӄᒤ䇑ࡂ
China’s Tenth Five-Year Economic and Society Development ѝॾӪ≁઼ޡഭഭ≁㓿⍾઼⽮Պਁኅㅜ
Plan
ॱњӄᒤ䇑ࡂ
Denatured Fuel Ethanol Production Standard
ਈᙗ⟳ᯉ҉䞷ഭᇦḷ߶

Year
1996
2001
2001



Production Standard for Bioethanol Gasoline for Automobiles

䖖⭘҉䞷⊭⋩ഭᇦḷ߶

2002

Pilot Testing Program of Bioethanol Gasoline for Automobiles

䖖⭘҉䞷⊭֯⭘䈅⛩ᯩṸ

2002

Detailed Regulations for Implementing the Pilot Testing Program
of Bioethanol Gasoline for Automobiles
Pilot Testing Program for Extensive Use of Bio-Ethanol Gasoline
for Automobiles
Executive Details regarding Extensive Use of Bio-Ethanol
Gasoline for Automobiles
Renewable Energy Law
Notice Concerning Taxation Policy Regulating Fuel Ethanol Pilot
Producers
China’s Eleventh Five-Year Economic and Society Development
Plan” (the Eleventh Five-Year Planå
Interim Measure for Administrating Renewable Energy
Development Fund
Notice Regarding Strengthening the Administration to Bioethanol
Projects and Promoting Healthy Development of Bioenergy
Industry
Biodiesel Blend Standard (BD100)

䖖⭘҉䞷⊭⋩֯⭘䈅⛩ᐕᇎᯭ㓶ࡉ

2002

䖖⭘҉䞷⊭⋩᧘ᒯ䈅⛩ᯩṸ

2004

䖖⭘҉䞷⊭⋩ᢙབྷ䈅⛩ᐕᇎᯭ㓶ࡉ

2004

ਟ⭏㜭Ⓚ⌅
ޣҾ҉䞷⭏ӗ䈅⛩Ⲵ〾᭦᭯ㆆⲴ䙊⸕

2005
2005

ѝॾӪ≁઼ޡഭഭ≁㓿⍾઼⽮Պਁኅㅜ
ॱањӄᒤ䇑ࡂ
ਟ⭏㜭Ⓚਁኅу亩䍴䠁㇑⨶Ჲ㹼⌅

2006

ޣҾᕪ⭏⢙⟳ᯉ҉䞷亩ⴞᔪ䇮㇑⨶ˈ
׳䘋ӗъڕᓧਁኅⲴ䙊⸕ X

2006

⭏⢙Ḥ⋩ਸḷ߶%'

2007

2006

Mid and Long Term Development Plan for China’s Renewable
Energy
Directive Advice Regarding Improving Sustainable Development
of Corn’s Further Processing
Notice about Taxation Policy for Products Generated from
Comprehensive Utilization of Resources
Biodiesel Blend Standard (B5)
Twelfth Five Year Strategic Plan for Renewable Energy
Development
National Standard for Biodiesel Fuel
Notice Regarding Adjusting Subsidy to Bioethnoal

ѝഭਟ⭏㜭ⓀⲴѝ䮯ᵏਁኅ䇑ࡂ

2007

ޣҾ׳䘋⦹㊣␡ᐕڕᓧਁኅⲴᤷሬ
㿱
ޣҾ䍴Ⓚ㔬ਸ࡙⭘৺ަԆӗ૱٬〾᭯
ㆆⲴ䙊⸕
⭏⢙Ḥ⋩ਸḷ߶%
ਟ⭏㜭ⓀਁኅㅜॱҼњӄᒤ䇑ࡂ

2007

⭏⢙Ḥ⋩ഭᇦḷ߶
ޣҾ䈳ᮤ⭏⢙҉䞷㺕䍤Ⲵ䙊⸕

2011
2012

2008
2010
2011



Appendix 2 Table A2.1 News Reports Related to China’s Land Acquisition for Biofuels in Africa
from 2007-2014
Number

Author

Date

Name

Media

ͺ

1

6/3/2007

Bio-Energy Development in Africa
Stimulate Debate

Xinhuanet.com

2

8/2/2007

Africa Will
Biofuels

Bio1000.com

3

9/20/2007

Biofuel, a Treatment Worse Than
Disease?

163.com

4

10/23/200
7

Brazil Call on Africa
BiofuelsRevolution

Ce.cn

5

10/25/200
7
11/8/2007

Which Countries Have the Biggest
Potential for BiofuelsDevelopment
Zambia Government Reassert Its
Support For BiofuelsDevelopment

7

12/10/200
7

Biofuel: Africa’s New Fossil Oil?

Xinhuanet.com

8

12/11/200
7
12/13/200
7

The Benefits and Risks of
Biofuelsto Developing Countries
Biofuel: Risk or New Development
Opportunity for Africa?

Xinnong.com

6

9

Start

Producing

for

a

Bioon.com
Xinhuanet.com

Bioon.com

URL
http://news.xinhuanet.com/
world/200706/03/content_6191559.htm
http://www.gdyd.com/news/
Information/200708/31815.
html
http://money.163.com/07/09
20/16/3ORJPQOV002524SJ
.html
http://www.ce.cn/cysc/ny/xn
y/200710/23/t20071023_13
342530.shtml
http://www.bioon.com/biolo
gy/bioengery/314216.shtml
http://www.ah.xinhuanet.co
m/swcl2006/200711/08/content_11614298.ht
m
http://www.ah.xinhuanet.co
m/swcl2006/200712/10/content_11902461.35
htm
http://www.xinnong.com/ne
ws/20071211/25433_2.html
http://www.bioon.com/bioin
dustry/bioenergy/341721.sht
ml

Chinese Name of
Article
䶎⍢ᔰਁ⭏⢙㜭Ⓚ
ᕅਁҹ䇞
䶎⍢ሶᔰ⭏ӗ⭏
⢙⟳ᯉ
⭏⢙⟳ᯉˈ∄⯮⯵
ᴤ㌏㌅Ⲵ⋫⯇˛
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⭏⢙⟳ᯉ˖ሩ䶎⍢
ᱟ仾䲙䘈ᱟᯠⲴᵪ
䙷
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10

12/27/200
7

African Countries Favor Renewable
Energy, BiofuelsWill Advance
Sustainable Development

Chinapower.com.
cn

http://www.chinapower.com
.cn/newsarticle/1041/new10
41779.asp

11

1/9/2008

People.com.cn

http://finance.people.com.cn
/GB/71364/6752776.html

12

8/7/2008

For Mitigating Energy Shortage,
Africa Equally Focus on Exploring
New Energy Resource and Energy
Efficiency
African Countries Are Eager to
Develop Biofuels

Xinhuanet.com

13

8/14/2008

Looking for Alternative Energy,
Focus on Biofuel

Bioon.com

http://news3.xinhuanet.com/
newscenter/200708/07/content_6490563.htm
http://news.bioon.com/articl
e/6292845.html

14

09/04/200
8

ZTE’s New Strategy: Overseas
Planting

Sina.com

15

2/24/2009

BiofuelsIndustry
Has
Quietly
Started in Southern Africa

Bioon.com

16

04/03/200
9

China and Zambia will Work
Together to Develop Biofuels

Bioon.com

17

4/10/2009

Thoughts
and
Suggestions
regarding
Exploring
Cassava
Resource in Africa

Ce.cn

07/14/200
9

ZTE will Invest to Build One
Million Hectare Palm Oil Planter in
DRC

Biotech.org.cn

7/14/2009

Zambia
Investment
and
Development Agency Signed A
Memorandom with a German

Sina.com

18

19

Bin Liu

http://finance.sina.com.cn/ch
anjing/b/20080904/1012527
1561.shtml
http://www.bioon.com/bioin
dustry/bioenergy/385292.sht
ml
http://www.bioon.com/bioin
dustry/bioenergy/389178.sht
ml
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http://big5.ce.cn/gate/big5/in
tl.ce.cn/gjzx/africa/as/sd/200
905/14/t20090514_1907510
4.shtml
http://www.biotech.org.cn/i
nformation/70697

൘䶎⍢ᔰਁᵘ㯟䍴
ⓀⲴᙍ㘳ᔪ䇞

http://finance.sina.com.cn/ro
ll/20090714/15302948587.s
html
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20

12/04/200
9

Company regarding Producing
Biodiesel Using Jatropha
ZTE
Invest
Heavily
on
BiofuelsProjects

21

01/06/201
0

Suggestions for Exploring Cassava
Resources in Africa

Zgny17.com

01/30/201
0

The World Bank Economist Calls
African Countries to Speed up on
Making BiofuelsPolicy

Cri.cn

http://gb.cri.cn/27824/2010/
01/30/2625s2745909.htm

23

8/31/2010

Sina.com

http://news.sina.com.cn/o/20
10-0831/090918044892s.shtml

24

09/03/201
0

Many Countries are Acquiring Land
in Africa for Biofuel, African
Continent’s
Appearance
is
Changing
A Fight for Land Going on in Africa
in Order to Make Biofuels

163.com

http://news.163.com/10/090
3/15/6FLRU8SE000146BC.
html

7/14/2011

Wuhan Kaidi Entering Zambia for
Bio-Energy Development

Ccin.com.cn

26

7/19/2011

Wuhan Kaidi Will Invest 450
Million USD in Zambia for
BiofuelsDevelopment

Sina.com

http://www.ccin.com.cn/cci
n/news/2011/07/14/188839.
shtml
http://finance.sina.com.cn/ro
ll/20110719/032310169416.
shtml

27

07/30/201
1

The Hat of “Land Grabbing” in
Africa should not be Put on China

Ifeng.com

28

8/10/2011

Villagers in Kenya are Evicted from
Their Home by Biofuels

022net.com

29

8/20/2011

BiofuelsDevelopment is Delayed,
Non-Grain BiofuelsDevelopment
should Accelerate

qq.com

22

Ͳ

25

Chunju
Guo

Dong
Mu, Qing
Meng

Ccin.com.cn

http://www.ccin.com.cn/cci
n/news/2009/12/04/102949.
shtml
http://www.zgny17.com/stor
y/html/news_1360.html

http://news.ifeng.com/gundo
ng/detail_2011_07/31/80675
67_0.shtml
http://www.022net.com/201
1/810/501357202952513.html
Ht36tp://news.qq.com/a/201
10822/000521.htm
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30

Hairong
Yan, Boli
Sha

08/25/201
1

China’s Big Investment in Africa:
Agriculture Neoliberalism or New
Neocolonialism

21ccom.net

http://www.21ccom.net/artic
les/qqsw/qyyj/article_20110
82544007.html

31

Yanan
Wang,
Chen
Song

09/08/201
1

Persistence
and
Reward:
Interviewing ZTE’s Vice President
for Middle East and Africa Area

Xinhuanet.com

http://news.xinhuanet.com/f
ortune/201109/08/c_122005836.htm
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32

9/13/2011

Chinanews.com

http://www.chinanews.com/
gj/2011/0913/3321782.shtml
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33

9/23/2011

India and Saudi Arabia are
Spending Heavily in Africa on
Acquiring Land for Agricultural
Growth
Report
Says
China’s
Land
Acquisition in Africa is Damaging
Local People’s Interest

163.com

http://news.163.com/11/092
2/18/7EITNS4H00014JB5.h
tml

34

10/20/201
1

Bioenergy: Carbon Mitigation can
Reach as High as 1 Billion Tons
Annually

Xinhuanet.com

http://news.xinhuanet.com/e
nergy/201110/20/c_122176777.htm

35

11/09/201
1

ZTE Communication: Develop Oil
Palm
Planter
to
Optimize
Investment Structure

Aweb.con.cn

http://news.aweb.com.cn/20
111109/462272004.shtml

01/21/201
2

An
Interview
to
Chinese
Ambassador in DRC – Yingwu
Wang: Fully Take All Advantages
to Help Companies’ Overseas
Development

Ifeng.com

http://news.ifeng.com/gundo
ng/detail_2012_01/21/12118
255_0.shtml

37

7/18/2012

SCB Reports Positively on SinoAfrica Agricultural Trade Potential

Sina.com

38

09/04/201
2

Foreign Media Reports US
Company is Land-Grabbing in the
Name of Assistance

Sina.com

http://finance.sina.com.cn/n
ongye/nyhgjj/20120718/172
312601058.shtml
http://news.sina.com.cn/w/2
012-0904/031925093322.shtml
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Jianguo Wei: Three Questions
Existing in Companies’ Investment
in Africa

Hexun.com
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Jirong
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40

04/09/201
3

SG BiofuelsCorporation will Enter
Southeast Asia or Africa within Six
Months

Biotech.org.cn

41

7/13/2013

News365.com

42

9/6/2013

Africa, a New Continent for Ningbo
Companies
"Going
Global"
Strategy
New Europe: EU should End
Africa’s
Pain
on
BiofuelsDevelopment

Ifeng.com

19/152232952.html?from=rs
s
http://www.biotech.org.cn/i
nformation/106536
http://www.news365.com.cn
/xwzx/gd/201307/t20130713
_1322980.html
http://finance.ifeng.com/a/2
0130906/10623893_0.shtml
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43

Wen
Wang

09/18/201
3

China Goes Overseas, Africa is the
Paradise

China.com.cn

44

Wen Ren

10/12/201
3

EU Will Possibly Slow Down
BiofuelsDevelopment

Bioon.com

45

12/20/201
3

Department of Commerce Issued
‘Guidance for Outward Investment
by Countries (Areas)’

People.com.cn

46

05/05/201
4

European and American Countries
‘s Land Acquisition in Africa Is
Damaging Local Agriculture

Xinhuanet.com

http://news.xinhuanet.com/
world/201405/05/c_126460969.htm

Europe and US’s Land Grabbing in
Africa
is
Damaging
Local
Agriculture
Keqiang Li on Sino-Africa
Friendship: You will Never Forget
Someone Who Has Cried With You
Keqiang Li: Focus on Sino-Africa
Cooperation in Green and Low
Carbon Field

163.com

http://news.163.com/14/050
5/05/9RF5DBIO00014AED.
html
http://politics.people.com.cn
/n/2014/0506/c100124978756.html
http://news.ifeng.com/a/201
40508/40212965_0.shtml
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Jirong
Yuan

5/5/2014

48

Mei Gao

5/6/2014
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Jinchao
Guo

5/8/2014

People.cn

Ifeng.com

http://www.china.com.cn/ne
ws/world/201309/18/content_30069848.ht
m
http://www.bioon.com/bioin
dustry/bioenergy/584126.sht
ml
http://finance.people.com.cn
/n/2013/1220/c7084623902861.html
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50

7/15/2014

Weijun Sun:Julong Group is
Commited to be a Successful
“Going
Global”
Agricultural
Company, Business in Africa will
Start This Year

Tj.people.cn

http://www.022net.com/201
4/715/541550252820810.html

08/04/201
4

‘Land grabbing’ myth and Chinabashing
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